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A Science of Reasoning: Extended Abstract  * 
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Edinburgh, EH1 1HN, Scotland 
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Abstract  
How can we understand reasoning in general and mathematical  proofs in particular? It 
is argued that a high-level understanding ofproofs is needed to complement the low-level 
understanding provided by Logic. A role for computation is proposed to provide this 
high-level understanding, namely by the association of proof plans with proofs. Criteria 
are given for assessing the association of a proof plan with a proof. 
1 Mot ivat ion:  the understanding of mathemat ica l  
proofs 
We argue that Logic 1 is not enough to understand reasoning. It provides only a low- 
level, step by step understanding, whereas a high-level, strategic understanding is also 
required. Many commonly observed phenomena of reasoning cannot be explained with- 
out such a high-level understanding. Furthermore, automatic reasoning is impractical 
without a high-level understanding. 
We propose a science of reasoning which provides both a low- and a high-level un- 
derstanding of reasoning. It combines Logic with the concept of proof plans, [Bundy 88]. 
*The research reported in this paper was supported by SERC grant GR/E/44598 and an SERC Senior 
Fellowship to the author. I would like to thank other members of the mathematical reasoning roup at 
Edinburgh for feedback, especially Frank van Harmelen, Colin Phillips, Mitch Harris and Toby Walsh. I 
am grateful for comments on the first draft of this paper from two anonymous referees. The full version 
of this extended abstract will appear in ~Computational Logic: Essays in Honor of Alan Robinson", MIT 
Press, forthcoming. 
1 We adopt the convention of using uncapitalised 'logic' for the various mathematical theories and 
capitalised 'Logic' for the discipline in which these logics are studied. 
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We illustrate this with examples from mathematical  reasoning, but it is intended that 
the science should eventually apply to all kinds of reasoning. 
2 The Need for Higher-Level  Exp lanat ions  
A proof in a logic is a sequence of formulae where each formula in the sequence is either 
an axiom or is derived from earlier formulae in the sequence by a rule of inference. 
Each mathematical  theory defines what it means to be a formula, an axiom or a rule 
of inference. Thus Logic provides a low-level explanation of a mathematical  proofl It  
explains the proof as a sequence of steps and shows how each step follows from previous 
ones by a set of rules. Its concerns are limited to the soundness of the proof, and to the 
truth of proposed conjectures in models of logical theories. 
While Logic provides an explanation of how the steps of a proof fit together, it is 
inadequate to explain many common observations about mathematical  proofs. 
• Mathematicians distinguish between understanding each step of a proof and un- 
derstanding the whole proof. 
• Mathematicians recognise families of proofs which contain common structure. 
• Mathematicians use their experience of previously encountered proofs to help them 
discover new proofs. 
• Mathematicians distinguish between ' interesting' and 'standard'  steps of a proof. 
• Mathematicians often have an intuition that a conjecture is true, but this intuition 
is fallible. 
• Students of mathematics,  presented with the same proofs, learn from them with 
varying degrees of success. 
3 Common Structure  in Proofs 
Several researchers in automatic theorem proving have identified common structure in 
families of proofs. For instance, 
[Bundy & Welham 81] describes the common structure in solutions to symbolic 
equations. This common structure was implemented in a process of recta-level 
inference which guided the search for solutions to equations. 
[Bundy et al 88] describes the common structure in inductive theorems about nat- 
ural numbers~ lists, etc. This common structure was implemented as an inductive 
proof plan which was used to guide the search for proofs of such theorems. 
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[Bledsoe et al 72] describes the common structure in theorems about limits of unc- 
tions in analysis. This common structure was implemented as the limit heuristic 
and used to guide the search for proofs of such theorems. 
[Wos & McCune 88] describes the common structure in attempts to find fixed- 
points combinators. This common structure was implemented asthe kernel method 
and used to guide the search for such fixed-points. 
[Polya 65] describes the common structure in ruler and compass constructions. 
This common structure was implemented by [Funt 73] and used to guide the search 
for such constructions. 
4 Proo f  P lans 
Common structure in proofs can be captured in proof plans. A proof plan consists of 
two parts: a tactic and a method. A tactic is a procedure which constructs part of 
a proof by applying a sequence of rules of inference. High-level tactics are defined in 
terms of lower-level sub-tactics. The lowest level tactics will apply individual rules of 
inference. A method is a partial specification of a tactic. It consists of preconditions 
which must be satisfied before the tactic is executed and some effects which will be true 
provided the tactic application is successful. 
Proof plans have been implemented within the OYSTER-CLAM system, [Bundy et al 88]. 
OYSTER is a theorem prover for Intuitionist Type Theory. CLAM is a plan formation pro- 
gram which has access to a number of general-purpose tactics and methods for inductive 
proofs. This system has been used to control the search for inductive proofs about natu- 
ral numbers and lists. CLAM constructs a special-purpose proof plan for each conjecture 
out of its methods and tactics. The tactic of the proof plan is then executed. It in- 
structs OYSTER to build a proof of the conjecture. The search for a proof plan at the 
meta-level is considerably cheaper than the search for a proof at the object-level. This 
makes proof plans a practical solution to the problems of search control in automatic 
theorem proving. 
5 The High-Level  Understand ing of Proofs 
Thus a high-level explanation of a proof of a conjecture is obtained by associating a proof 
plan with it. The tactic of this proof plan must construct the proof. The method of 
this proof plan must describe both the preconditions which made this tactic appropriate 
for proving this conjecture and the effects of this tactics application on the conjecture. 
It must also describe the role of each sub-tactic in achieving the preconditions of later 
sub-tactics and the final effects of the whole tactic. 
In fact, this association provides a multi-level explanation. The proof plan associated 
with the whole proof provides the top-level explanation. The immediate sub-tactics and 
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sub-methods of this proof plan provide a medium-level xplanation of the major sub- 
proofs. The tactics and methods associated with individual rules of inference provide a 
bottom-level xplanation, which is similar to that already provided by Logic. 
The general-purpose tactics and methods which we will use to build proof plans, 
and the association of proof plans with proofs will constitute the theories of our science 
of reasoning. This extends the way in which logical theories and the association of 
logical proofs with real proofs and arguments, constitute the theories of Logic (especially 
Philosophical Logic). Just as Logic also has meta-theories about the properties of and 
relations between logical theories, we may also be able to develop such meta-theories 
about proof plans. 
6 What  is the Nature  of our Sc ience of  Reason ing?  
Before we can dignify this proposed study of the structure of proofs with the epithet 
science we must address a fundamental problem about the nature of such a science. 
Traditional sciences like Physics and Chemistry study physical objects and the way 
they interact. The subject of our proposed science is proof plans. But proof plans are 
not physical objects. If they can be said to exist at all it is in the minds of mathemati- 
cians proving theorems, teachers explaining proofs and students understanding them. 
Physicists assume that the electrons in the apple I am eating as I write are essentially 
the same as the electrons in some distant star. But proof plans will differ from mind to 
mind and from time to time. There will be billions of such proof plans. Are we doomed 
merely to catalogue them all? Given the difficulty of discovering the nature of even one 
such proof plan, what a difficult and ultimately pointless task this would be. We would 
prefer to narrow our focus on a few representative proof plans. But on what basis could 
these few be chosen? 
Fortunately, this is not a new problem. It is one faced by all human sciences to some 
extent and it is one that has been solved before. Consider the science of Linguistics. 
In Linguistics the theories are grammars and the association of grammatical structure 
with utterances. Linguists do not try to form different grammars for each person, but 
try to form a grammar for each language, capturing the commonality between different 
users of that language. They try to make these grammars as parsimonious as possible, 
so that they capture the maximum amount of generality within and between languages. 
Linguists do not claim that everyone or anyone has these target grammars tored in 
their head - -  nor, indeed, that anyone has a grammar at all - -  only that they specify 
the grammatical sentences of the language. 
Another example is Logic itself. Again judged by the arguments people produce, the 
logical laws differ between minds and vary over time. Logicians do not try to capture 
this variety, but confine themselves to a few logics which specify 'correct' arguments. 
As with grammatical sentences, correct arguments are identified by initial observation 
of arguments actually used and consultation with experts to decide which of these are 
correct. 
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I place our proposed science of reasoning between Linguistics and Logic. Proof 
plans are more universal than grammatical rules, but it is possible to associate different, 
equally appropriate proof plans with the same proof. The study of proof plans appeals 
both to an empirical study of the way in which mathematicians structure theirproofs 
and to reflection on the use of logical laws to put together proofs out of parts. 
Thus there are strong precedents for a science that takes mental objects as its domain 
of study and tames the wide diversity of exemplars by imposing a normative xplanation 
informed by reflection and empirical study. It only remains to propose criteria for 
associating proof plans with proofs that will enable us to prefer one proof plan to 
another. This we can do by appealing to general scientific principles. Our proposals are 
given in the next section. 
7 Criter ia for Assess ing Proo f  P lans 
If there were no criteria for the association of proof plans with proofs, then we could 
carry out our programme by associating with each proof an ad hoe tactic consisting of 
the concatenation f the rules of inference required to reproduce it, and constructing 
an ad hoe method in a similar way. This would not go beyond the existing logical 
explanation. 
The only assessment criterion we have proposed so far is correctness, i.e. that the 
tactic of the proof plan associated with a proof will construct that proof when executed. 
We now discuss ome other possible criteria. 
• Intuit iveness: the way in which the proof is structured by a proof plan accords 
with our intuitions about how we structure the proof. 
Psychological Validity: there is experimental evidence that all, most or some math- 
ematicians producing or studying proofs also structured a proof in the way sug- 
gested by some proof plan. 
• Expectancy:. there must be a basis for predicting the successful outcome of a proof 
plan. 
• Generality: a proof plan gets credit from the number of proofs or sub-proofs with 
which it is associated and for which it accounts. 
• Prescriptiveness: a proof plan gets more credit the less search its tactic generates 
and the more it prescribes exactly what rules of inference to apply. 
• Simplicity: a proof plan gets more credit for being succinctly stated. 
• Ejfficieney: a proof plan gets more credit when its tactic is computationally effi- 
cient. 
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• Parsimony; the overall theory gets more credit the fewer general-purpose proof 
plans are required to account for some collection of proofs. 
We might start designing proof plans using the criteria of intuitiveness and psy- 
chological validity as sources of inspiration, but then use the criteria of correctness, 
expectancy, generality, prescriptiveness, simplicity, efficiency and parsimony to revise 
them. 
8 The Role of the Computer  
So far we have not involved the computer in this methodological discussion. One might 
expect it to play a central role. In fact, computers have no role in the theory, but play 
an important practical role. Computation plays a central role in the theory, because the 
tactics are procedures and they are part of the theory of our science of reasoning. It is 
not, strictly speaking, necessary to implement these tactics on a computer, since they 
can be executed by hand. However, in practice, it is highly convenient. It makes the 
process of checking that the tactics meet the criteria of the §7 both more efficient and 
less error prone. Machine execution is convenient: 
• for speeding up correctness testing, especially when the proof plans are long, or 
involve a lot of search, or when a large collection of conjectures i to be tested; 
• to automate the gathering of statistics, e.g. on size of search space, execution 
time, etc; 
• to ensure that a tactic has been accurately executed; and 
• to demonstrate to other researchers that the checking has been done by a disin- 
terested party. 
In this way the computer can assist the rapid prototyping and checking of hypothesised 
proof plans. Furthermore, in its 'disinterested party' role, the computer acts as a 
sceptical colleague, providing a second opinion on the merits of hypothesised proof plans 
that can serve as a source of inspiration. Unexpected positive and negative results can 
cause one to revise ones current preconceptions. 
9 The Relat ion to Automat ic  Theorem Proving 
Although our science of reasoning might find application in the building of high perfor- 
mance, automatic theorem provers, the two activities are not co-extensive. They differ 
both in their motivation and their methodology. 
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I take the conventional motivation of automatic theorem proving to be the building 
of theorem provers which are empirically successful, without any necessity to understand 
why. The methodology is implied by this motivation. The theorem prover is applied 
to a random selection of theorems. Unsuccessful search spaces are studied in a shallow 
way and crude heuristics are added which will prune losing branches and prefer winning 
ones. This process is repeated until the law of diminishing returns makes further epe- 
titions not worth pursuing. The result is fast progress in the short term, but eventual 
deadlock as different proofs pull the heuristics in different directions. This description 
is something of a caricature. No ATP researchers embody it in its pure form, but aspects 
of it can be found in the motivation and methodology ofall of us, to a greater or lesser 
extent. 
Automatic theorem provers based on proof plans make slower initial progress. Initial 
proof plans have poor generality, and so few theorems can be proved. The motivation 
of understanding proofs mitigates against crude, general heuristics with low prescrip- 
tiveness and no expectancy. The 'accidental' proof of a theorem is interpreted as a fault 
caused by low prescriptiveness, rather then a lucky break. However, there is no eventual 
deadlock to block the indefinite improvement of the theorem prover's performance. If
two or more proof plans fit a theorem then either they represent legitimate alternatives 
both of which deserve attempting or they point to a lack of prescriptiveness in the 
preconditions which further proof analysis hould correct. 
Thus, we expect a science of reasoning will help us build better automatic theorem 
proving programs in the long term, although probably not in the short term. 
10 Conc lus ion  
In this paper we have proposed a methodology for reaching a multi-level understanding 
of mathematical proofs as part of a science of reasoning. The theories of this science con- 
sist of a collection of general-purpose proof plans, and the association of special-purpose 
proof plans with particular proofs. Each proof plan consists of a tactic and a method 
which partially specifies it. Special-purpose proof plans can be constructed by a process 
of plan formation which entails reasoning with the methods of the general-purpose proof 
plans. Ideas for new proof plans can be found by analysing mathematical proofs using 
our intuitions about their structure and, possibly, psychological experiments on third 
party mathematicians. Initial proof plans are then designed which capture this struc- 
ture. These initial proof plans are then refined to improve their expectancy, generality, 
prescriptiveness, implicity, efficiency and parsimony while retaining their correctness. 
Scientific judgement is used to find a balance between these sometimes opposing criteria. 
Computers can be used as a workhorse, as a disinterested party to check the criteria 
and as a source of inspiration. 
The design of general-purpose proof plans and their association with particular 
proofs is an activity of scientific theory formation that can be judged by normal sci- 
entific criteria. It requires deep analysis of mathematical proofs, rigour in the design 
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of tactics and their methods, and judgement in the selection of those general-purpose 
proof plans with real staying power. Our science of reasoning is normative, empirical 
and reflective. In these respects it resembles other human sciences like Linguistics and 
Logic. Indeed it includes parts of Logic as a sub-science. 
Persona l  Note  
For many years I have regarded myself as a researcher in automatic theorem proving. 
However, by analysing the methodology I have pursued in practice, I now realise that 
my real motivation is the building of a science of reasoning in the form outlined above. 
Now that I have identified, explicitly, the science I have been implicitly engaged in for 
the last fifteen years, I intend to pursue it with renewed vigour. I invite you to join me. 
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